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1 Introduction
Tax revenue as a proportion of GDP is typically about 20 percentage points lower
in African countries than in rich OECD countries. Yet one of the salient features
of African countries is an apparent under-provision of public goods in areas such
as health, basic education or infrastructure. If there are unrealized benefits from
public spending, why isn’t taxation increased to enable more public projects to
be undertaken? There are various possible responses to this question, and the
answer may be different in different countries. Some African governments may
not have the objective of maximizing social well-being, and so may under-provide
public goods. Perhaps the assumption of high returns to public spending is false
in practice, possibly because of inefficient or corrupt implementation of projects.1
Or perhaps the cost of public funds is higher in African countries than in rich
countries. The paper explores this last response. It examines the marginal cost
of public funds (MCF) - the change in social welfare associated with raising an
additional unit of tax revenue using a particular tax instrument - in 38 African
countries.
The central role of the MCF in tax policy is well known. The literature on
this topic dates back at least thirty years, but it is almost entirely focused on
the tax systems of high income countries. We know of only one African country,
Cameroon, for which MCF estimates have been published (see Table 1 in Section
2). MCF estimates are particularly hard to come by for African countries, given
the paucity of data and the cost of building sophisticated computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models to obtain these estimates.2 Thus, the challenge as we
have conceived it is to develop a simple CGE model that can be calibrated with
little more than national accounts data, and can be used to provide consistent
estimates comparable across African countries. We estimate the MCFs for the five
key African tax instruments: domestic sales taxes, import and export taxes, and
corporate and personal income taxes.
Discussion of our MCF estimates provides a lens through which many of the
major issues of African tax reform can be viewed. Over the past 10-20 years,
African countries have lowered trade taxes to improve competitiveness, and intro-
1A further possible explanation is that the benefits of risk-related public spending (e.g., social
security, health insurance) are relatively greater in rich economies (see Devarajan & Hammer
(2002)). Tanzi & Schuknecht (2000) show that the difference between OECD and developing
countries’ public expenditure is the OECD’s expenditure on social security; expenditure on
goods and services is about the same as a proportion of GDP.
2Substitution effects, which are at the heart of the dead-weight loss of taxation, are poorly
captured by partial equilibrium analysis. CGEs are required because real tax systems are com-
plex, and because it is necessary to take account of multiple interactions within tax systems.
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duced VATs, in part to compensate for lost trade tax revenues. In our 38 countries,
from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s, on average trade taxes fell from 35.2% of
tax revenue to 29.6%, while total tax revenue rose on average from 13.7% to 17.1%
of GDP.3 The list of 30 countries that now have VATs is included in our data set in
Appendix 2. Our model and MCF estimates suggest directions for further reform
of tax structures. A given level of revenue can be obtained at lower welfare cost
by increasing a tax with a low MCF and lowering a tax with a high MCF. Low
values of MCF estimates indicate that in most countries additional revenue could
be raised with relatively low efficiency cost, in most cases using higher VATs, but
in some cases through higher trade taxes. We find no general rules that imports
or exports should not be taxed, so that MCF estimates are needed in order to
determine appropriate directions for change in trade taxes. Finally, we estimate
low MCFs in the informal economy, indicating priorities for the removal of tax
exemptions.
Our model deals explicitly with the informal economy, a key requirement for
realism. As a by-product of our model’s calibration, we have produced estimates
of the untaxed economy based on official GDP data. Viewing GDP as the sum of
all output, our calibration algorithm indicates untaxed goods represent an average
of 35% of GDP. Viewing GDP as the sum of all income, untaxed factor payments
constitute an average 56% of GDP. Our measures of the untaxed economy are not
identical with efforts to measure the shadow economy, such as Schneider & Enste
(2000). To the extent that the shadow economy includes activities that are not
caught in measures of GDP, our measure is smaller. To the extent that we include
legal activities that are captured in GDP and happen not to be taxed by one of
our five taxes, our measure is larger. Nevertheless, there is overlap between these
measures (see Table 11 in the Appendix), and we use the terms ‘untaxed’ and
‘informal’ interchangeably.
Inclusion of the informal sector in our model is important in two respects in
the modeling of MCFs. We might suspect that in countries with larger informal
sectors, it is easier for economic agents to shift from formal to informal activity.
Greater substitutability would lead to higher marginal costs of taxation on formal
activity. We find that larger informal sectors are typically associated with higher
MCFs.4 Inclusion of informal goods and factors also permits us to model taxes on
3These figures are based on data from IMF country report Statistical Annexes, using the
earliest and most recent data available from reports available online. The periods covered differ
for each country, with 1992/3 the median first year, and 2005 the median final year. Trade tax
revenues as a proportion of GDP rose from 4.7% to 4.9% on average. The share of trade taxes
in tax revenue rose in 15 countries, and tax revenue as a proportion of GDP fell in 9 countries.
4Fortin & Lacroix (1994) suggest the informal sector accounts for around 0.02-0.05 of their
MCF estimates of 1.39-1.53 for labour taxation in Canada. They note that although small,
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domestic goods and factor taxes using legally specified rates, rather than ‘effective’
tax rates which are commonly modeled in CGEs.5
After a brief review of the existing literature in Section 2, we present the model
in Section 3. The model is inspired by the minimal data requirements of the ‘1-2-3
model’ of Devarajan, Go, Lewis, Robinson, & Sinko (1994). The basic 1-2-3 model
has one country with two producing sectors and three goods: a domestic good,
exports and imports. This model is extended to include production of an informal
good, an intermediate investment good, and four factors of production: formal
capital, informal capital, formal labour and informal labour. Our definition of an
informal good or factor is one on which no tax is paid.
In section 4 we apply the CGE model to produce estimates of MCFs for 5 taxes
in 38 African countries, vastly increasing the number of developing countries for
which MCF estimates exist. Our base case estimate of the average MCF from
marginal increases in all five tax instruments is 1.21, with a plausible range of
1.19 to 1.29. These estimates provide a basic blueprint for tax reform in Africa,
indicating the high cost taxes that are ripe for cutting, and the low cost taxes which
could be increased. Sensitivity testing of the model reveals which elasticities are
the most important in determining MCF magnitudes, and suggests that our base
case estimates are reasonably robust for purposes of tax reform. We also estimate
the impact of administrative costs on MCFs.
In Section 5 we examine two central aspects of tax reform – the reform of
tax structures, and the priorities for extending the tax base – with particular
attention to the implications of Africa’s large informal sectors. We ask whether
African policies of lowering trade taxes and expanding the application of VATs are
appropriate. We find the VAT and import tariff are typically the key optimal tax
instruments, but in some cases taxes on exports and factors are also optimal. The
optimality of taxes on inputs follow from the presence of the informal economy.
In respect of tax base broadening, we ask how much administrative cost should
be spent in order to bring parts of the informal economy into the tax system.
On average the administrative cost thresholds above which efforts to impose an
existing tax on currently untaxed sectors becomes more costly than simply raising
the impact of the informal sector increases rapidly with the level of the marginal tax rate.
The importance of the informal sector when analyzing taxation in developing countries is also
emphasized in other settings by García Peñalosa & Turnovsky (2003) and Emran & Stiglitz
(2005).
5We do, however, use effective tax rates for trade taxes. ‘Effective’ tax rates are calculated
as tax revenues divided by sector size. They provide an average between taxpayers who pay
tax at something like the legal rate, subject to some under-reporting, and informal producers or
consumers who pay no tax. Effective tax rates underestimate the marginal tax rate incurred by
those who actually pay tax and are thus likely to underestimate MCFs.
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the existing tax rate are quite high.
We conclude in section 6 with a review of several issues in African tax reform,
interpreted in the light of our results.
2 The Marginal Cost of Public Funds
The MCF measures the change in social welfare associated with raising an addi-
tional unit of tax revenue using a particular tax instrument:
MCF = −∆W
∆R
(1)
where ∆W is a monetary measure of the change in social welfare and ∆R is the
change in tax revenue arising from a marginal change in a tax instrument. The
change in social welfare is a measure such as the equivalent variation or change in
consumer surplus. Table 1 sets out a selection of existing estimates. Additional
estimates are reported by Dahlby (2008), who provides a comprehensive treatment
of the existing MCF estimates.
Unfortunately, existing estimates are not all comparable. The literature is
plagued by multiple definitions of the same concepts. Useful reviews of the the-
oretical and empirical literature on MCFs can be found in Ballard & Fullerton
(1992) and Devarajan et al. (2001). Different measures of the MCF for the same
tax instrument can be found according to the nature of the tax experiment con-
ducted, the choice of numeraire, and the attribution of some general equilibrium
effects between benefit and cost.
Ballard & Fullerton (1992) identify two broad classes of theoretical analysis:
‘differential’ and ‘balanced budget.’ In differential analysis, one tax is marginally
increased and another is decreased sufficiently to maintain the budget balance.
The usual experiment is to increase a distortionary tax, and to reduce a lump-sum
tax (return the revenue to consumers as a lump-sum). The income effects of the
two tax changes cancel, leaving only substitution effects. Estimates of the welfare
change,∆W , depend on compensated elasticities, while the change in revenue,∆R,
can be equated with the actual lump-sum transfer. In balanced-budget analysis,
one tax is marginally increased and the revenue is spent on a public project.
Income effects are included in the analysis, and MCF estimates are derived using
uncompensated elasticities. These are not the only possible measures. Wildasin
(1984) proposed a measure in which the compensated change in welfare is divided
by the compensated change in tax revenue rather than the actual change in tax
revenue.
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Table 1: Selected MCF Estimates
Country Tax type Estimate Source
Australia Labour 1.19-1.24 Campbell & Bond (1997)
Australia Labour 1.28-1.55 Findlay & Jones (1982)
Australia Capital 1.21-1.48 Diewert & Lawrence (1998)
Australia Capital 1.15-1.51 Benge (1999)
Bangladesh Sales 0.95-1.07
Devarajan, Suthiwart-Narueput
& Thierfelder (2001)
Bangladesh Import 1.17-2.18 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Cameroon Sales 0.48-0.96 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Cameroon Import 1.05-1.37 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Canada Commodity 1.25 Campbell (1975)
Canada Labour 1.38 Dahlby (1994)
Canada Labour 1.39-1.53 Fortin & Lacroix (1994)
China Sales 2.31 Laffont & Senik-Leygonie (1997)
India Excise 1.66-2.15 Ahmad & Stern (1987)
India Sales 1.59-2.12 Ahmad & Stern (1987)
India Import 1.54-2.17 Ahmad & Stern (1987)
Indonesia Sales 0.97-1.11 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Indonesia Import 0.99-1.18 Devarajan et al. (2001)
New Zealand Labour 1.18 Diewert & Lawrence (1994)
Sweden All taxes 1.69-2.29 Hansson & Stuart (1985)
United States All taxes 1.17-1.33 Ballard, Shoven & Whalley (1985)
United States Labour 1.21-1.24 Stuart (1984)
United States Labour 1.32-1.47 Browning (1987)
United States All taxes 1.47 Jorgenson & Yun (1990)
United States Labour 1.08-1.14 Ahmed & Croushore (1994)
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The choice of numeraire can also change estimates of the MCF. Håkonsen
(1998) has proposed a measure derived from the dual of the government’s optimal
tax problem (maximize revenue subject to a given level of social welfare) that is
invariant to the choice of numeraire.
Finally, the attribution of some effects of public spending can also affect the
size of MCF estimates. Consider a marginal tax increase that increases revenue
by one dollar, before public spending occurs. Public spending could increase the
tax base in a second round effect (for example, building highways increases petrol
tax revenue). If this second round effect is attributed to the MCF, the increase in
revenue is greater than one dollar, and the MCF is accordingly reduced. But the
second round effect could equally well be attributed to a measure of the marginal
benefit of public spending. Mayshar (1991) proposed that all revenue effects of
public spending should be incorporated in the benefits measure (MBF), rather
than the MCF.
Fortunately, Schöb (1994) has shown that standard MCF measures provide a
valid basis for revenue-neutral tax reform, provided they are prepared using con-
sistent methodologies. The levels of MCF estimates will depend on the estimation
methodology, but these levels are not important in deciding directions for reform.
What is important is which tax instruments have high MCFs and which have low
MCFs. For tax reform, MCFs can be thought of as an ordinal measure. For our tax
reform analysis, estimates of the MCF for different tax instruments are prepared
using common methodologies. By virtue of Schöb’s (1994) result, our estimates
indicate priorities for the reform of African tax structures.
3 The Model
Our model is formally set out in Appendix 1. Four goods are consumed in the
economy: untaxed (U ), domestic (D), imports (M ), and leisure (Z ).6 The rep-
resentative consumer has endowments of leisure (which may be converted into
labour), capital, and foreign exchange, which is used to purchase imports from the
rest of the world.7
6Leisure is included only to permit robustness testing of the elasticity of labour supply. In
our base case, this elasticity is set to zero, and there is no leisure. Leisure differs from informal
labour in that it enters directly into the consumer’s welfare function, and is not used as an input
into production.
7The endowment of foreign exchange represents the trade balance. In Africa, this is financed
by borrowing and foreign aid. In a static model borrowing has no purpose, and the endowment
can be thought of as foreign aid.
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Figure 1: Utility and Production Functions
Utility Investment Domestic Exports Untaxed
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On the production side of the economy, three final goods are produced in
the country: untaxed (U ), domestic (D), and exports (E ). Exports are used to
purchase foreign exchange (at a constant exchange rate), which is used to purchase
imports (M ) from the rest of the world. In addition investment (I ) is modeled as
an intermediate good, which is used as an input into each of untaxed, domestic,
and exports.
The production goods use four factors of production: formal capital (Kf ),
informal capital (Ki), formal labour (Lf ) and informal labour (Li).8 Taxation of
a fixed endowment will not alter its supply and so will not result in a deadweight
loss. Dividing factors into formal and informal introduces substitution possibilities,
and so permits the possibility of deadweight losses associated with factor taxation.
The inclusion of informal factors is thus critical for the estimation of factor MCFs.
It is assumed that production is competitive, so that all funds received by firms
are paid out to factors.
Nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions are used in all pro-
duction and utility functions. The structure of these functions is set out in Figure
1, with σ denoting elasticities of substitution between inputs, and τ denoting elas-
ticities of transformation between outputs.
8The informal good uses only informal capital and informal labour.
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The first panel in the diagram is the consumer’s utility function, where utility
(W ) is a function of leisure Z, and a consumption good C, and C is a compos-
ite good derived from a CES function of untaxed, domestic, and imports. The
endowment of time can be adjusted to determine the elasticity of labor supply.
The second panel illustrates the investment good CES function, combining
inputs of imports and domestically produced inputs (N). The treatment of in-
vestment is driven by its role in the national accounts, where investment is defined
as capital goods with a life greater than one year. Some of these capital goods
are produced domestically, and some are imported. The model captures a static
snapshot of the ongoing process of capital accumulation, with long-lived capital a
necessary input into the production process: investment is itself an input into the
final good production functions.9 The domestically produced investment inputs,
N , consist of domestic and untaxed goods. Goods that are exported cannot serve
as an input.
The last three panels are the production functions for domestic, export and
untaxed. The top parts of domestic and untaxed production functions are con-
stant elasticity of transformation (CET) functions, where N is produced jointly
with the main good. We keep these CET elasticities at 1 in our model, keeping
production of long-lived capital assets at a constant share of the value of total out-
put. The bottom parts of the three production function diagrams represent the
nested CES functions over the factors of production, including capital/labour sub-
stitution, and formal/informal substitution. These factors are in turn combined
with inputs of investment, in further CES functions, with elasticities σID, σIE, and
σIU .
Even though the production technology is the same, we separate production of
investment inputs, N , from production of domestic and untaxed goods to permit
different tax treatment. We apply a zero tax rate to domestically produced in-
vestment inputs. This corresponds to cases where investment inputs are produced
within the investing enterprise and so escape taxation, or where taxation permits
full deduction of the costs of business inputs. On the public side of the economy
taxes are thus imposed on domestic, exports, imports, formal capital, and formal
labour. There are no untaxed traded exports or imports. This is not meant to
imply that no smuggling occurs in African countries. Rather, the official figures
for trade are based on customs data, which typically reflects taxed goods. An im-
plication is that the untaxed good is produced and consumed purely domestically.
Tax revenue received by the Government is transferred lump-sum to consumers.
9Use of final good outputs as inputs into an intermediate good is standard in static CGE
models, and can be considered to represent a long-run steady state (see Sue Wing (2004)).
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The experiment of increasing a distortionary tax rate and returning the revenue
lump-sum can be interpreted in terms of both ‘differential’ and ‘balanced-budget’
analysis. As emphasized in Section 2, for purposes of MCF estimates the realism
of the modeled public expenditure is not as important as the fact that a consistent
experiment is conducted across tax instruments.
The data are given in Appendix 2. Country-specific data comprise values of
exports, imports, investment, and tax revenues for each of the five taxes, and legal
tax rates for domestic goods, capital and labour. These data were obtained from
IMF country report Statistical Annexes.
Data for tax revenue from sales of domestic are derived from tax revenues from
domestic VATs or sales taxes. Corporate income tax revenues are interpreted as
tax revenues from formal capital. Personal income tax revenues are equated with
revenues from formal labour. Data for tax revenues from exports and imports are
taken directly from the national accounts.
On average, in the countries that we examine, taxes on domestic goods, im-
ports, exports, personal income tax, and corporate income tax represent respec-
tively 20%, 38%, 2%, 13%, and 16% of tax revenue, with the remaining 11%
coming from other sources. Twenty countries in our sample do not use export
taxes. Among the eighteen countries that do use them, export taxes constitute 4%
of tax revenue. We ignore classes of tax revenue that do not fall into any of the
five tax revenue classes of the model. We assume that these other tax revenues
are unaffected by shocks to the model’s five tax rates, implicitly treating them as
lump-sum taxes.
The calibration process is described in Appendix 3. The sizes of the exports,
imports and investment are taken directly from the national accounts data. The
size of the domestic good is determined by dividing domestic tax revenues by
the legal tax rate. The size of the untaxed sector is the remainder of GDP after
domestic, exports, and goods taxes are accounted for. Formal factor payments are
similarly determined by dividing tax revenues by legal tax rates. Total payments
to informal factors are the residual of GDP after formal factors and investment are
accounted for, with their allocation between production goods and between capital
and labor determined in proportion to the production of the relevant formal goods
and factors, and for the untaxed good using an assumed labour-output ratio of
52%.10 Imports are separated into consumption and investment goods, reflecting
the ratio of consumption to investment in the national accounts. Domestic pro-
duction of investment inputs (N) is the national accounts figure for investment,
less imported investment goods.
10The figure is based on data derived from five African countries, as indicated in Appendix 2.
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Calibration of the model is completed with specification of the elasticities in
the utility and production functions. In our base case, we set all CES and CET
elasticities at unity.
Setting the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption at unity,
the elasticity of labour supply can be calibrated by changing the endowment of
time. In our base case we set this endowment to achieve a zero elasticity of labour
supply, and cover the possibility of positive elasticity in robustness testing.
We are unaware of estimates of the consumption function’s elasticity of sub-
stitution between our aggregate informal and taxed goods, but there is evidence
on the economy’s price elasticity of import demand (which includes demand for
both consumption and investment goods). Shocking the import price in our base
case model reveals an average price elasticity of import demand of -0.76. Emran &
Shilpi (2007) provide estimates for India and Sri Lanka in the range -0.63 to -0.79,
with a mean of -0.72, which supports our base case elasticities. Other evidence
suggests unitary import price elasticities (see, eg. Senhadji (1998)), and we deal
with this possibility in robustness testing of the model.
On the production side of the economy, Cobb-Douglas production functions,
with unitary elasticity of factor substitution, have long been a modeling workhorse,
and we have continued in this tradition. Tybout (2000) surveys the empirical
literature on production in developing countries, reporting returns to scale close to
unity in all industries covered by the literature, in India, Indonesia and Africa. This
evidence supports the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production. However, Chirinko
(2008) provides a survey which suggests that long-run elasticities of substitution
between capital and labour are in the range of 0.4 to 0.6 in OECD countries. We
deal with this possibility in robustness testing of the model, testing an elasticity
of 0.5.
4 MCF Estimates
We calculated the MCFs associated with six different shocks to tax rates. In
the first five experiments we increased each tax rate individually by adding one-
ten-thousandth of a percentage point to the existing tax rate (eg. from 10% to
10.0001%). The small increment is intended to capture the essence of a marginal
change to the tax rate. In the sixth experiment we increased all five tax rates
simultaneously by one-ten-thousandth of a percentage point.11 In each case the
11In the sixth experiment, any zero export tax rates are left unchanged, under the assumption
that in these countries increased export taxes are not a policy option.
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additional tax revenue, ∆R, was redistributed to consumers as a lump sum trans-
fer. The new equilibrium was established using a computable general equilibrium
model written using GAMS MPSGE. The welfare change induced by the com-
bined tax and spend experiment was measured in terms of the numeraire using
the equivalent variation, denoted EV . The MCF of the experiment was calculated
as:
MCF =
EV
∆R
. (2)
4.1 Base Case Results
Our MCF estimates are presented in Table 2. On average, the MCF associated
with a marginal increase in all five tax instruments is 1.21, indicating a required
rate of return of 21% for African public projects. Studying marginal increase of
specific tax intrument, the estimates provide a basic blueprint for tax reform in
each country. For any pair of tax instruments, the same total revenue could be
achieved for lower deadweight loss by lowering tax rates associated with a high
MCF and increasing low-MCF tax rates.
On average, taxes on the two taxed consumption goods (domestic and imports)
have low MCFs, while taxes on the two taxed factors (formal labour and formal
capital) have high MCFs.12 Looking at the lowest MCF in each country, the mean
is 1.087. On average, African countries could raise additional tax revenue with
an efficiency cost of just 8.7%. Outside of concessional donor funds, this is likely
to be among the cheapest potential sources of finance available in most African
countries.
The exports MCFs exhibit wide variation, to the point where the simple average
across countries yields little information. In seven cases, MCF(E) is negative,
because increasing the exports tax rate lowers total revenue (dR/dTE < 0).13
These cases can be grouped with high MCF values, in the sense that they indicate
that the exports tax is not an effective revenue-raising instrument. Examining
the 30 countries where (dR/dTE > 0), the average MCF (E) is 1.42. For the 15
countries with both strictly positive export tax rates and positive MCF(E), the
average MCF(E) is 1.54, but the maximum is 3.35 (Uganda) and the minimum
12In 26 countries, the domestic tax has the lowest MCF, in 9 countries the lowest is the imports
tax, and in 3 countries it is the exports tax. In making this comparison we ignore cases where a
marginal increase in the export tax reduces total revenue, resulting in MCF(E)<0.
13 In Eritrea, a marginal increase in TE reduces tax revenue, but this in turn increases welfare,
resulting in 0 < MCF (E) < 1.
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Table 2: MCF Estimates
Country D M E L K All
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1.08 1.07 1.11 1.30 1.60 1.10
Burundi 1.10 1.09 -0.37 1.74 1.57 1.18
Malawi* 1.19 1.18 1.65 1.65 1.68 1.26
Guinea Bissau 1.08 1.12 1.20 1.22 1.71 1.17
Ethiopia* 1.17 1.22 3.12 1.91 2.00 1.28
Niger 1.18 1.48 1.78 2.09 2.05 1.47
Eritrea* 1.15 1.13 0.58 1.99 1.65 1.21
Central African Rep. 1.17 1.13 1.37 1.79 1.62 1.22
Madagascar* 1.14 1.12 1.22 1.33 1.62 1.15
Rwanda* 1.23 1.27 -0.33 2.28 2.47 1.37
Togo* 1.07 1.09 1.16 1.47 1.58 1.12
Burkina Faso* 1.17 1.23 -2.91 1.68 1.59 1.27
Uganda 1.08 1.53 3.35 1.49 1.67 1.42
Ghana 1.05 1.12 1.30 1.38 1.36 1.17
Chad 1.09 1.05 1.02 1.26 1.18 1.06
Mali 1.09 1.27 1.59 1.62 1.84 1.29
Mozambique 1.14 1.06 1.11 1.35 1.54 1.12
Tanzania* 1.18 1.19 1.53 1.57 1.83 1.25
Gambia* 1.04 1.14 1.22 1.27 1.47 1.17
Benin 1.15 1.57 -1.24 2.55 2.55 1.72
Zambia* 1.13 1.09 1.48 1.23 1.58 1.16
Sudan 1.09 1.25 2.01 1.73 1.86 1.29
Guinea 1.14 1.12 1.19 1.45 1.64 1.16
Kenya* 1.11 1.16 1.42 1.32 1.44 1.18
Nigeria* 1.04 1.09 1.10 1.20 1.18 1.11
Mauritania* 1.06 1.08 1.14 1.31 1.31 1.11
Senegal* 1.08 1.19 1.50 1.48 1.70 1.19
Zimbabwe* 1.22 1.23 -0.06 1.50 1.71 1.31
Côte d’Ivoire 1.09 1.18 1.18 1.65 1.61 1.19
Cameroon* 1.04 1.06 1.15 1.22 1.29 1.08
Congo, Rep.* 1.11 1.05 1.03 1.33 1.41 1.09
Cape Verde* 1.09 1.17 -1.59 1.51 1.26 1.17
Swaziland 0.87 1.19 1.26 1.36 1.54 1.23
Namibia* 1.00 1.23 1.35 1.34 1.41 1.19
South Africa* 1.08 1.15 -0.25 1.22 1.21 1.13
Gabon 1.05 1.13 1.08 1.32 1.45 1.11
Botswana* 0.95 1.24 1.19 1.18 1.22 1.10
Equatorial Guinea 1.34 1.03 1.01 1.27 1.20 1.05
Average 1.11 1.18 0.96 1.51 1.60 1.21
Maximum 1.34 1.57 3.35 2.55 2.55 1.72
Minimum 0.87 1.03 -2.91 1.18 1.18 1.05
Std. Dev. 0.08 0.12 1.13 0.32 0.31 0.13
In this and subsequent tables, countries are ordered by GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$,
for the year from which the relevant data are drawn. * indicates countries with zero export
taxes.
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is 1.01 (Equatorial Guinea). The variability of MCF(E) can be understood by
noting that exports is an input into imports, so that the total tax on imports is
the product of both the exports and imports taxes.14
4.2 Robustness of Results
We tested the robustness of our MCF estimates to changes in various parameters,
focusing particularly on the elasticities of substitution in the demand and pro-
duction functions. The results of robustness testing are set out in Table 3. The
notation for the relevant elasticities is set out in Figure 1. For each experiment,
any unmentioned elasticity is the same as in our base case (that is, all CES and
CET function elasticities of substitution are 1, and the elasticity of labour supply
is 0).
In experiments 1-9 we lowered specific elasticities of substitution to values of
0.5, and in experiments 10-18 we increased the same elasticities to 2. In exper-
iments 6-9 and 15-18, changes in the consumer’s elasticity of substitution (σC)
between the three consumption goods (U , D, and M) resulted in large variation
of MCF(All), ranging from 1.11 to 1.53. Changes in production CES elasticities
resulted in little change in our base case estimates, with MCF(All) ranging from
1.19 to 1.24.
In experiments 19 and 20 we also tested the possibility of positive elasticity of
labor supply, notwithstanding evidence from developed countries that the elasticity
is zero.15 A small labor supply elasticity of 0.05 induced a negligible change in our
estimated MCFs. An implausibly large elasticity of labour supply of 1.0 increased
average MCF (All) to 1.27, and increased average MCF (L) to 1.75 (compared
with 1.51 in the base case).
Our choice of marginal tax rate for labour was in places arbitrary, choosing
from multiple rates in personal income tax schedules. In experiments 21 and 22
we tested the effect of increasing and decreasing the marginal labour tax rate by
5 percentage points. The resulting average MCF (L) values were 1.60 and 1.43.
Other MCF estimates were little changed.
A check on the reasonableness of each experiment’s parameter changes is pro-
vided in the column listing the absolute value of the resulting elasticity of import
demand (M). Emran & Shilpi (2007) find that a mean estimate of M is 0.72,
and our base case is close to this. However, Senhadji (1998) suggests M = 1. We
14The level of import tariffs appears to have a stronger influence on MCF(E) than the export
tax rate. Among the 15 countries with strictly positive export taxes and positive MCF(E), linear
regression of MCF(E) on the import tariff gaveMCF (E) = 0.7+0.044TM with R2 = 0.58, while
regression on the export tax rate gave MCF (E) = 1.5− 0.02TE , with R2 = 0.004.
15The elasticity of labor supply is varied by changing the endowment of time, while keeping
constant the consumer’s CES elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption goods
(σW = 1).
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Table 3: Sensitivity Testing
Experiment D M E L K All M (1) (2) (3)
1 σD = σE = σU = 0.5 1.10 1.17 0.96 1.52 1.59 1.20 0.76 38 35 38
2 σKD = σLD = σKE = σLE = 0.5 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.36 1.40 1.19 0.76 28 20 27
3 σD, σE , σU , σKD , σLD, σKE , σLE = 0.5 1.10 1.17 0.96 1.37 1.40 1.19 0.76 28 18 27
4 σLD = σLE = 0.5 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.36 1.59 1.20 0.76 31 19 33
5 σI = 0.5 1.11 1.15 0.72 1.50 1.58 1.19 0.67 33 30 36
6 σC = 0.5 1.04 1.11 0.77 1.32 1.40 1.12 0.51 25 21 31
7 σI = σC = 0.5 1.05 1.08 1.76 1.28 1.38 1.11 0.42 33 29 34
8 σC = σD = σE = σU = 0.5 1.04 1.11 0.76 1.33 1.40 1.12 0.51 25 21 31
9 σI = σC = σD = σE = σU = 0.5 1.05 1.08 1.74 1.28 1.38 1.11 0.42 33 29 34
10 σD = σE = σU = 2 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.50 1.59 1.21 0.76 35 35 37
11 σKD = σLD = σKE = σLE = 2 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.99 2.29 1.24 0.76 33 29 34
12 σD, σE , σU , σKD , σLD, σKE , σLE = 2 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.98 2.29 1.24 0.76 32 28 34
13 σLD = σLE = 2 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.99 1.59 1.22 0.76 20 16 31
14 σI = 2 1.10 1.23 1.31 1.57 1.67 1.24 0.91 30 24 31
15 σC = 2 1.26 1.37 0.99 3.18 3.50 1.44 1.24 30 24 31
16 σI = σC = 2 1.25 1.49 1.83 1.08 2.05 1.52 1.42 27 20 31
17 σC = σD = σE = σU = 2 1.27 1.37 1.08 2.94 3.67 1.45 1.24 30 24 29
18 σI = σC = σD = σE = σU = 2 1.26 1.49 14.42 173.32 12.53 1.53 1.43 31 26 31
19 labor elasticity=0.05 1.11 1.18 0.98 1.53 1.59 1.21 0.77 27 16 26
20 labor elasticity=1 1.16 1.23 1.19 1.75 1.61 1.27 0.87 37 35 37
21 TL + 0.05 1.11 1.18 1.05 1.60 1.60 1.21 0.76 26 19 27
22 TL − 0.05 1.10 1.17 0.83 1.43 1.59 1.20 0.76 36 29 34
23 σI = σC = 1.367 1.16 1.26 2.29 1.74 1.86 1.29 1.00 29 25 28
24 σI = σC = 1.375; 1.15 1.26 2.51 1.56 1.62 1.27 1.00 34 31 34
σD, σE , σU , σ
K
D , σ
L
D, σ
K
E , σ
L
E = 0.5
Columns D, E, M, K, L, and All report average MCFs for the 38 countries. Column M reports
the average elasticity of import demand resulting from the assumed elasticities of substitution.
Columns (1), (2) and (3) indicate the number of countries that give recommendations for tax
reform that are ‘close’ to those of the base case, in the following senses. In column (1) the tax
instruments found to have the highest and lowest MCFs are the same as in the base case. In
column (2) all five individual MCFs are ranked in the same order as in the base case. In column
(3) at most one pairwise comparison of MCFs gives a different recommendation from the base
case estimates.
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calibrated the model to achieve average M = 1 by varying σC and σI , in exper-
iments 23 and 24. Assuming values of 0.72 ≤ M ≤ 1.00, a reasonable range for
estimates of MCF (All) is 1.19 to 1.29, with our preferred estimates in the range
1.19 to 1.21.
For partial revenue-neutral tax reform, it is the ordering of MCF estimates
that is important, not their magnitudes. For such reform, the aim is to compare
two tax instruments, increase the tax rate on the low MCF tax, and decrease
the tax rate on the high MCF tax. Table 3 reports the number of countries in
which the ordering of MCFs is robust to changes in parameters. Three measures
of robustness are used. The first measure supposes that reform is concentrated on
the most extreme MCFs. The two tax instruments with the highest and lowest
MCFs are identified. If these two instruments are the same as in the base case,
the ordering is considered robust. Among the five tax instruments there are ten
pairwise comparisons that are possible, identifying for each pair the high and
low MCF instruments. The second measure of robustness requires that all ten
such comparisons report the same pairwise ordering. This implies that all five
instruments follow the same order as in the base case. The third measure of
robustness permits just one pairwise comparison to give a different ordering from
the base case.
On the basis of the first measure the ordering of MCF estimates was robust
to variations in parameters on average in 30 out of 38 countries with a minimum
of 20. The ordering of MCFs was fully robust to the tested parameter changes on
average in 25 countries with a minimum of 16. And on average in 31 countries,
the ordering of MCFs was unchanged for 9 out of 10 pairwise comparisons, with a
minimum of 26 countries. These results suggest that the MCF orders implied by
the base case are reasonably robust to changes in the parameters. However, for
any particular revenue-neutral reform it would be necessary to examine the results
for the country in question.
4.3 Costs of Tax Administration
One of the features of taxation in Africa is relatively high administrative costs.
Table 4 provides an international comparison of administrative costs, measured
by dividing the expenses of tax collection agencies by the revenue collected. The
average for rich countries is 1.36%, 1.88% for Latin American countries, and 2.35%
for African countries.16
A taxpayer paying a dollar of taxes suffers the same loss of utility regardless of
whether the administration has paid 2 cents or 50 cents to enforce the collection.
Further, the administration costs are not lost to society. They are paid to civil
16Not all of the tax agencies represented in these figures collect all types of taxes. Since the
collection costs vary by tax type, this may give a distorted impression of some agencies efficiency.
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Table 4: Tax Administration Costs
Country Year(s) Cost/Collections
Australia 2001-2002 1.2%
Canada 2001-2002 2.3%
New Zealand 2001-2002 1.2%
UK 2001-2002 1.6%
US 2002 0.5%
Guatemala 1999-2001 1.9%
Mexico 1995, 1997-98 1.7%
Peru 1996-1998 1.9%
Venezuela 1995-1998 2.0%
Ghana 1993 2.8%
Kenya 1995-2000 1.2%
Namibia 2001-2002 1.3%
South Africa 1998-2001 1.1%
Tanzania 1996-1997 3.0%
Uganda 1991-2000 3.6%
The cost/collections ratio reports the annual cost of tax collection agencies divided by the
amount of money collected. For data sources, see Appendix 6.
servants and other providers of goods and services. Thus, tax administration costs
do not alter ∆W in our MCF formula (1).17 Administration costs do, however,
alter ∆R, by reducing the net revenue available for government spending. If we
suppose that administration costs constitute µ% of tax revenue collected, a tax
shock that changes gross revenue by ∆R changes net revenue by ∆R(1 − µ)%.
Incorporating administrative costs in our MCF estimates is thus a simple matter
of multiplying our existing estimates by 1
1−µ .
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Table 4 indicates that on average µ = 2.35% in Africa. On this evidence,
our base case results should be multiplied by 1.024. Table 5 reports the resulting
adjusted average MCFs from Table 2. Although Africa has more costly tax ad-
ministrations than other regions, this alone is unlikely to result in substantially
higher marginal costs of public funds.
If administrative costs of tax instruments differ, they could alter the MCF
rankings. One of the arguments against the introduction of VATs, for example,
is their high administrative cost.19 Assuming that the taxes on imports, labour,
and capital have administrative costs of 2.35%, the adjusted MCF for domestic
taxation would exceed the adjusted MCFs for imports, labour, and capital, on
17We treat as negligibly small the marginal change in consumer surplus forgone on goods that
could have been produced using the factors of production involved in tax administration.
18See Ahmad & Stern (1987), Slemrod & Yitzhaki (1996).
19Munk (2008) shows that the level of administrative costs has a bearing on the optimality of
border taxes, in the presence of an informal sector.
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Table 5: Average MCFs Incorporating Administration Costs
Domestic Imports Exports Labour Capital All
1.13 1.20 0.99 1.55 1.63 1.23
average, if the administrative cost of domestic taxation exceeded the following
thresholds: 8% for imports, 28% for labour, and 32% for capital.20 That is, almost
one-third of the revenue from a VAT could be consumed in administration cost
before its adjusted MCF would exceed the adjusted MCF of the corporate income
tax. These are wide margins, and help to explain why 30 countries in our sample
have introduced VATs, notwithstanding the administrative costs they impose on
the economy.
5 Tax Reform
The two most basic topics of tax reform are the structure of existing tax rates, and
the bases on which taxes are levied. Our model can be applied to shed light on
recent reforms of tax structures, and to suggest the level of resources which should
be devoted to extending existing taxes into the informal economy.
5.1 Reforming Tax Structures
We noted in the introduction that African economies have in recent years been
reducing trade taxes, and introducing VATs. Piggott & Whalley (2001), Emran
& Stiglitz (2005), and Munk (2008) illustrate cases where in the presence of an
informal sector, elimination of trade taxes and their replacement with a VAT
reduces welfare. To assess the strength of such effects in the African context, we
derived optimal taxes to achieve each country’s existing revenue. Starting from
zero tax rates for all five taxes, we iteratively and incrementally increased the tax
with the lowest MCF until the revenue target was achieved.21 The resulting tax
structures are set out in Table 6.
In all countries, optimal taxation includes a tax on domestic, and a tax on one
of either imports or exports. The mutual exclusivity of optimal taxes on imports
and exports can be understood by noting that in our model exports are the sole
inputs into imports, so that taxing either imports or exports reduces both, in equal
proportions. The effect of an exports tax on the quantity of exports could be
20And dealing with the average MCF for exports in countries where MCF(E)>0, the threshold
would be 23%
21We did not increase taxes when doing so would lower total revenue (ie dR/dt < 0). We
conducted several iterations of tax-raising, starting with zero factor taxes and rates of goods
taxation that were progressively higher but still less than required to generate the revenue target.
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Table 6: Optimal Tax Structures
tD tM tE tL tK Optimal ∆W (1) ∆W (2) η
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) MCF (%) (%) (%)
Congo, Dem. Rep. 13.1 14.1 0 0 0 1.07 0.3 0.5 48
Burundi 18.0 20.6 0 0 0 1.07 0.7 1.2 61
Malawi 22.0 26.8 0 0 0 1.13 1.0 1.8 54
Guinea Bissau 16.8 18.9 0 0 0 1.10 0.4 0.9 48
Ethiopia 20.5 23.1 0 0 0 1.16 0.7 1.4 49
Niger 25.2 0 42.5 0 0 1.21 0.9 2.4 39
Eritrea 16.3 17.4 0 0 0 1.07 1.0 1.4 72
Central African Rep. 16.9 19.7 0 0 0 1.12 0.4 0.8 50
Madagascar 18.4 19.6 0 0 0 1.12 0.3 0.9 29
Rwanda 22.8 26.8 0 0 0 1.17 1.2 2.0 57
Togo 19.0 21.7 0 0 0 1.09 0.4 0.9 40
Burkina Faso 22.0 25.9 0 0 0 1.17 0.5 1.3 39
Uganda 28.1 0 47.0 0 0 1.20 1.2 3.0 40
Ghana 21.0 21.1 0 0 0 1.08 0.8 1.5 51
Chad 3.8 0 6.9 0.3 0.9 1.02 0.9 1.0 92
Mali 26.4 31.0 0 0 0 1.17 0.8 2.2 39
Mozambique 14.8 15.6 0 0 0 1.08 0.4 0.8 54
Tanzania 22.4 26.3 0 0 0 1.16 0.5 1.3 38
Gambia 24.6 27.3 0 1.0 0 1.13 0.6 1.9 34
Benin 31.7 41.4 0 0 0 1.27 1.8 3.7 49
Zambia 22.8 24.1 0 0 0 1.10 0.7 1.5 48
Sudan 18.5 21.3 0 0 0 1.15 0.4 0.8 48
Guinea 17.2 19.7 0 0 0 1.12 0.2 0.7 34
Kenya 24.6 29.2 0 0 0 1.12 0.7 1.7 39
Nigeria 17.1 0 19.2 0 4.3 1.06 0.7 1.3 51
Mauritania 18.9 18.6 0 0.9 0.7 1.07 0.5 1.1 46
Senegal 25.5 28.5 0 0 0 1.13 0.8 2.0 41
Zimbabwe 25.6 32.9 0 0 0 1.15 1.2 2.3 53
Côte d’Ivoire 19.3 0 28.6 0 0 1.08 1.1 1.9 56
Cameroon 19.4 20.2 0 3.2 3.3 1.05 0.5 1.0 51
Congo, Rep. 9.6 0 9.6 2.1 2.0 1.03 1.0 1.3 80
Cape Verde 24 23.1 0 0 0 1.10 0.7 1.8 42
Swaziland 30.7 0 44.3 1.3 0 1.07 2.0 4.2 47
Namibia 30.0 0 37.1 3.3 0 1.09 1.9 4.0 47
South Africa 28.4 32.5 0 0 0 1.08 0.8 1.8 3
Gabon 14.2 0 16.7 4.6 5.6 1.04 1.4 1.9 70
Botswana 20.5 0 17.2 3.7 3.9 1.04 1.9 2.6 74
Equatorial Guinea 7.8 0 9.9 0.2 5.6 1.04 4.6 5.9 79
Average 20.5 23.8 23.4 2.3 3.0 1.11 0.9 1.8 51
Averages of tax rates are calculated using only non-zero tax rates.
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reproduced with a VAT applied to both domestic and imported goods, combined
with an appropriately calibrated additional import tariff. But where the taxes
are levied makes a difference to the marginal cost of public funds.22 Accordingly,
depending on the elasticities of the entire general equilibrium system, exports taxes
may be required for optimal taxation.
The presence of significant optimal trade taxes appears to validate criticisms of
general policies of lowering trade taxes. But as Keen (2008) stresses, the VAT also
applies to imported goods. In our sample, the average optimal tax on domestic
is 20.5%, while the average optimal tax on imports is 23.8%. If a VAT of 20.5%
is levied on all domestic and imports, then an ad valorem import tariff of 2.7%
is required to achieve the average optimal imports tax rate. That is, in countries
with VATs, these results support low rates of tax on imports.23
A VAT does not, however, serve as a replacement for an optimal export tax.
In particular, exports are frequently zero-rated, meaning that no VAT is paid
on sales, but credit is given for tax paid on inputs. In the 11 countries where
optimal taxation recommends positive exports taxes, welfare would be reduced by
the elimination of exports taxes combined with revenue-neutral increases in the
VAT, confirming the point made by Emran & Stiglitz (2005).24 The importance of
this result can be measured. We calculated welfare under optimal taxes in the 11
countries, and then recalculated optimal taxes under the constraint of zero taxes
on exports. Unconstrained, a movement from existing tax structures to optimal
taxes increases welfare by an average of 1.61% across the 11 countries. With the
constraint of zero export taxes, the welfare gain is 1.03%.
Summarizing these findings, in most countries an optimal structure would in-
clude a VAT, a small imports tariff, and a zero exports tax. But there are some
countries where taxes on imports should be zero (including a zero VAT for im-
ports), and exports taxes should be relatively large.
Several further observations follow from our calculation of optimal taxes. The
presence of factor taxes in 11 countries contrasts with the common belief that these
taxes play no efficiency role in optimal taxation, and should be included in the tax
system only to address equity goals. In conjunction with optimal taxes on exports,
the results serve as a reminder that the Diamond & Mirrlees (1971) production
efficiency result (ie. optimal taxes should be levied only on final goods, and not
on inputs) does not necessarily hold when not all final goods can be taxed (see,
for example, Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1974)). The optimality of factor taxes may be
related to the size of the informal sector. The untaxed good represents an average
22For example, in Niger, with optimal tax rates of TD = 25.2%, TE = 42.5%, and TM = 0%,
the corresponding costs of funds are MCF (D) = 1.21, MCF (E) = 1.21, and MCF (M) = 1.39.
23The limits of lowering import tariffs may have been reached. The average tax rate on imports
in our calibrated data (which includes revenue derived from VATs) is 21.4%, which is less than
the average optimal imports tariff.
24The average rate of taxes on exports in these 11 countries is 1.3% in our data, much lower
than the average 23.4% recommended by optimal taxation.
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of 28% of GDP in countries where optimal factor taxes are strictly positive, and
7% of GDP in countries where optimal factor tax rates are zero.
Moving to optimal taxes results in a single MCF for all non-zero taxes. Across
the 38 countries, the average of these optimal MCFs is 1.11, much lower than the
average MCF(All)=1.21 reported in Table 2. A lower cost of public funds would
permit a wider range of public projects. These additional public projects could,
in a dynamic setting, augment the static gains reported here.
We define three measures of the potential benefits of reform: ∆W (1) is the wel-
fare improvement resulting from a revenue-neutral move from existing tax struc-
tures to optimal tax structures, measured as a percentage of the consumer’s initial
level of income; ∆W (2) is the welfare improvement resulting from the elimination
of all taxes; and η = ∆W (1)
∆W (2)
× 100 reports the first measure as a proportion of
the second, reflecting the relative importance of the revenue target and the tax
structure in terms of efficiency cost. On average, ∆W (1) = 0.9%, ∆W (2) = 1.8%,
and η = 51%: reforming tax structures would achieve just over half of the gains
of entirely eliminating distorting taxes. There is, however, wide variation in the
potential impact of revenue-neutral reform of tax structures: η ranges from a mini-
mum of 34% to a maximum of 92%, with higher values indicating greater potential
benefits. Reform of tax structures should be on the reform agenda in countries
with high η.
5.2 Expanding the Tax Base
Perhaps the key distinguishing feature of African tax systems is the importance
of the informal sector. At the heart of the dead-weight loss of taxation is the
substitution effect. This effect is presumably greater when it is easier to escape
taxation. This suggests that economies with large informal sectors are likely to
have high MCFs associated with their existing taxes. Figure 2 plots our base case
estimates of MCF (All) against the calibrated value of untaxed, suggesting the
strength of this intuition. The Figure holds out the prospect that expanding the
tax base to include currently untaxed sectors could lower the MCFs of existing
taxes and offers the potential for additional revenue at low marginal cost: all else
equal, economic activities that are more lightly taxed than others will have lower
MCFs.
Pursuing the implications of Figure 2, we calculate the MCFs associated with
different parts of the informal sector. The detailed results of these experiments
are reported in Table 12 in the Appendix. Marginal taxes were imposed on: pro-
duction of the untaxed good (U); informal capital used anywhere in the economy
(Ki); informal capital used to produce domestic or export goods (KiDE); informal
labour used anywhere in the economy (Li); and informal labour used to produce
domestic or export goods (LiDE). We distinguished between taxing a factor wher-
ever it is used and taxing a factor when it is used to produce domestic or export
21
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.70
1.80
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Untaxed Output (% GDP)
M
C F
 
( A
l l )
Figure 2: MCF(All) as a Function of the Value of the Untaxed Good
goods because the latter seems more plausible. It seems more likely that the ad-
ministration will be able to tax a firm’s accounting profits (returns to capital) and
labour inputs in cases where the firm’s output is already taxed.25
The average MCF values for the new tax instruments are reported in the last
line (MCF i) of Table 7. Among the different tax instruments for taxing the infor-
mal sectors, the least cost way of raising money is by increasing taxes on untaxed
goods. The averageMCF (U) is 0.85, lower than the average MCF elsewhere in the
informal economy.26 But governments may hesitate to increase taxes of informal
goods if they care about distributional issues and poor households are concentrated
in production of untaxed goods or they consume a lot of untaxed goods.
When distributional issues are considered, a promising part of the untaxed
economy is informal capital used to produce taxed goods: average MCF (KiDE)
is 0.9. That is, imposing taxes on companies that produce taxed goods but do
not pay company tax generally offers a lower cost of public funds than increasing
25This is a second best policy. When taxation of informal factors is restricted to inputs to
domestic and export goods, the MCF is higher than when informal factors are taxed wherever
they are used: MCF (KiDE) > MCF (K
i) and MCF (LiDE) > MCF (L
i).
26In all countries the MCF of a tax on the untaxed good is less than 1 (see Table 12). The
negative welfare shock suffered by households (before the revenue is returned lump-sum) is smaller
than the increase in government revenue. Once lump-sum redistribution of the revenue occurs,
households are better off than before the tax shock. Increasing taxes in the informal sector helps
to counteract existing taxes in other sectors.
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Table 7: Administrative Cost Thresholds for Informal Taxes
U Ki KiDE L
i LiDE MCF
f
Domestic 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.08 1.11
Imports 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.13 1.18
Exports 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.27 1.40
Labour 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.33 1.51
Capital 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.36 1.60
All 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.16 1.21
MCF i 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.90 1.04
existing taxes elsewhere in the formal economy. In many cases such companies have
legal tax exemptions, which can be removed with low administrative expense.27
Removing such exemptions has the potential for a low marginal cost of taxation,
without obvious major effects on the poorest households.
Finally, we calculate the threshold levels of administrative costs for taxes in the
informal sector, as a proportion of revenue raised. Table 7 reports the thresholds at
which the average MCFs of informal sector taxes from Table 12 adjusted to include
administration costs, would be equal to our average base case formal sector MCFs
(Table 2) adjusted to include uniform 2.35% administration costs.28
Policy-makers considering a reform which would extend taxation into an un-
taxed sector could compare the estimated administrative costs of the new tax
against these thresholds. For example, extending the VAT (tax on domestic) to
a currently exempt firm’s sales (U), the relevant administrative cost threshold is
25% of the revenue raised. If it costs $600 to bring the firm into the tax system,
the revenue generated should be at least $2400. If the VAT has a 15% rate, and
value-added represents 35% of sales, then the appropriate threshold for application
of the VAT is sales greater than 2400
0.35×0.15 = $45, 714.
29
27In a survey of 197 businesses in Cameroon, Gauthier & Gersovitz (1997) report that 4 were
legally exempt from sales tax, while 30 were legally exempt from the business profits tax. In
Gauthier & Reinikka (2001) a similar survey of 158 businesses in Uganda reports 17 exemptions
from sales tax and 41 exemptions from the corporate income tax. Both studies found that
exemptions tended to be granted to large firms, while smaller firms were more likely to evade
tax illegally. Legal tax exemptions may be the result of corruption. Fjeldstad (2002) reports
that in the mid 1990s senior Tanzanian officials accepted bribes in return for tax exemptions:
“within the Ministry of Finance, the Revenue Department went under the nickname of the ‘Tax
Exemption Department.’ ”
28The exports MCF used is the average only for countries for whichMCF (E) > 0 and existing
exports taxes are non-zero.
29The example is a modified version of an example given by Keen & Mintz (2004), who uses a
different methodology and different assumption concerning the benchmark MCF to find a VAT
threshold of $40,000.
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6 Conclusion
We conclude by applying our findings to a series of issues in African tax policy.
First, we find little evidence that African taxation is more costly than in other
regions. Our preferred estimates in robustness testing, based on plausibility, are
in the range of 1.19 to 1.21 for MCF(All), suggesting low average MCFs in Africa,
associated with raising taxes on all five taxes simultaneously. While comparison
with MCF estimates produced using different methodologies is problematic, these
estimates are well within the range of other studies given in Table 1.30 Focusing
on the lowest MCF tax instrument in each country, the average MCF in our base
case estimates is 1.087, which is a low cost source of finance. Low MCF estimates
suggest there is scope for increasing total tax revenue in most African countries.
Second, our estimates provide support for the emphasis that reformers have
placed on VATs, with low MCFs indicating the efficiency of taxes on domestic and
imported goods. In our dataset, 30 countries have implemented VATs. This has
been part of a global tax reform wave over the past twenty years, documented
in Ebrill, Keen, Bodin & Summers (2002). Average MCF(D) is 1.11 and average
MCF(M) is 1.18. Benefits of VATs include the elimination of cascading of multiple
sales taxes, and a tendency to broaden the tax base through VAT reporting re-
quirements. Cascading of taxes raises the average and marginal tax rates applied
to goods that go through multiple intermediate steps in the production chain, so
we would expect the introduction of VATs to have lowered average MCFs. And
bringing untaxed goods into the tax base is associated with a very low average
MCF(U) of 0.85, indicating that it actually increases welfare. One of the con-
cerns in the introduction of VATs is the administrative cost involved. In very poor
countries, these administrative costs could be large relative to the revenue raised.
We find, however, that there is typically a wide margin for error. On average, in
order for the marginal cost of a VAT to exceed the marginal cost of other taxes,
the VAT’s administrative costs would need to exceed at least 23% of the revenue
raised, compared with African evidence that the costs of administering existing
taxes are less than 2.4%.
Third, our results suggest that Africa has perhaps reached the limits of the
process of lowering import tariffs, at least in respect of average import tariff rates.
In our data, the average tax rate applied to imports is 17%, compared with 16%
for domestic goods, an average margin of 1 percentage point. In the presence
of VATs applied to both domestic and imported goods, the import tariff can be
interpreted as a supplementary consumption tax applying only to imports. In an
30It is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the MCF in rich countries to provide directly
comparable results. There are several difficulties in adapting our model to rich countries. For
example, the European customs union must be modelled to examine import tariffs, and in the
United States, state level taxes complicate the analysis. Social security taxes also need to be
taken into account. These difficulties are not insurmountable, but we leave them for future
research.
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optimal tax structure, the supplementary import tariff is small. In countries with
optimal domestic and imports taxes, the tax rate on imports exceeded the tax
rate on domestic by an average of 2.8 percentage points. This suggests that the
reduction in import tariffs may have gone too far. Moving away from the ideal of
optimal taxation, the average MCF(M) associated with imports taxes is, at 1.18,
the second-lowest average MCF31 suggesting that it is a candidate for potential
increase if additional revenue is sought.
Fourth, our model does not support a general conclusion of zero rates of export
tax. In our sample data, 21 countries have eliminated export taxes entirely, and
the average exports tax rate in the remaining 17 countries is 1.6%. There appears
to be a growing consensus that export taxes are inappropriate. But our MCF
results reveal widely varying values of MCF(E), sometimes very low, sometimes
very high, and sometimes the instrument performs so poorly that it reduces total
revenue resulting in a negative MCF(E). The variability of MCF(E) carries over
into the optimal tax rates, where it is optimal to have either an imports tax or
an exports tax, but never both. There are 12 countries for which strictly positive
export taxes are optimal, of which 5 currently have zero export taxes. Where
export taxes are optimal, our results suggest that replacing them with consumption
taxes would induce an average welfare loss of around 0.5% (measured in terms
of the equivalent variation in the consumer’s income). These findings suggest
that caution is warranted in reducing export tariffs in countries where MCF(E) is
positive but small.
Fifth, estimates of the MCF in informal sectors provide guidance concerning
the social cost of tax exemptions. Some African countries have offered tax ex-
emptions to large companies with the aim of encouraging investment. Our MCF
estimates suggest the cost of such policies. The corporate income tax, for ex-
ample, is typically associated with a high MCF (average MCF (K) = 1.6). But
there is a low MCF associated with the imposition of a marginal tax on companies
that produce taxed goods but are exempt from the corporate income tax (average
MCF (KiDE) = 0.9). The removal of exemptions from goods taxation has an even
lower marginal cost (average MCF(U)=0.85), and from an efficiency point of view
should be the first priority when consideration turns to increasing revenue.
Sixth, our MCF estimates provide guidance for reformers about the level of
resources that should be devoted to extending taxes into informal sectors. Large
informal sectors are associated with high MCFs in the formal economy. Expanding
the tax base will help to lower the cost of public funds. While there may be equity
concerns associated with taxing some parts of the informal economy, the existence
of MCFs less than one in the informal economy suggests scope for increasing welfare
and tax revenue simultaneously. In turn, higher welfare and tax revenue suggests
the possibility of compensating the losers from tax base expansion. For example,
efforts to tax informal agriculture could be accompanied by increased roads main-
31Excluding negative MCF(E) for which dR/dTE < 0.
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tenance in rural areas. Measures to bring currently informal activities within the
tax base would be justified even if a large proportion of the additional revenue
were consumed in enforcement and administration (eg 25% or more in the case
of currently untaxed goods). Non-tax measures to reduce the informal economy
could also be effective tools in improving the efficiency of the tax system. Auriol
& Warlters (2005) suggest that governments could reduce substantially the size
of their informal sectors by reducing red tape barriers to business entry into the
formal sector. Such a policy would not only help to enhance revenue by enlarging
the tax base, but would also reduce the marginal cost of public funds.
Finally, we find that corporate and personal income taxes have high average
MCFs, suggesting that they should be reduced. In our data, average corporate tax
rates (33%) and MCF(K)= 1.6 are slightly higher than average personal income tax
rates (27%) and MCF(L) = 1.51. The role of factor taxes is sometimes understood
in terms of equity objectives, with progressive personal income tax serving a purely
distributional purpose, and the corporate income tax serving as a backstop to
prevent easy avoidance of the personal income tax. It is thus interesting to note
that instances of strictly positive factor taxes occur under optimal taxation in our
model, and that this appears to be related to the size of the informal sector.
Our model and MCF estimates provide tools for examining important issues in
tax policy. We are making our CGE model available on the editor’s website, in the
hope that it can be more widely applied to generate insights into the tax systems
of additional countries. The model runs on the free demonstration version of the
GAMS software.
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APPENDIX 1: Model Specification
The single representative consumer maximizes a CES utility function with four
goods: leisure (Z ), untaxed (U ), domestic (D), and imports (MC) subject to the
income constraint.
Max W = W (Z,U,D,MC) subject to PLZ + p˜uU + P˜DD + P˜MM ≤ Y
A tilde over a price indicates that it is tax-inclusive:
P˜j = (1 + Tj)Pj,∀j ∈ {D,E,M, I,N,KfD, KfE, LfD, LfE}
Consumer income is the value of the endowments of foreign exchange (a¯), time
(T¯ ), and capital (K¯) plus the transfer received from the government (R).
Y = a¯+ PLT¯ + PKK¯ +R
Leisure plus labour supply equals the time endowment.
Z + L = T¯
The consumer’s first order conditions are:
∂W/∂Z
PL
=
∂W/∂U
P˜U
=
∂W/∂D
P˜D
=
∂W/∂M
P˜M
Factors and investment are combined by CES production functions to produce
intermediate goods for untaxed (ψU), domestic (ψD), and a final good exports
(ψE). The factors used are capital and labour, each of which may be formal
(taxed) or informal (untaxed). The notation for factors is sqr : the amount of
factor s ∈ {K,L} used to produce good r ∈ {U,D,E}, where q ∈ {i, f} indicates
whether the factor is informal or formal.
ψU = γU(K
i
U , L
i
U , IU)
ψD = γD(K
i
D, K
f
D, L
i
D, L
f
D, ID)
XE = γE(K
i
E, K
f
E, L
i
E, L
f
E, IE)
The first order conditions determining factor usage in production, investment usage
in production, and investment inputs in production are given by:
∂ψr
∂sqr
=
P˜sqr
Pr
∂I
∂N
=
P˜N
PI
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∂ψI
∂x
=
P˜x
PI
, forx ∈ {M,N}
Investment inputs are combined to produce investment:
I = ψE(M,N)
The intermediate goods are divided between final goods and investment inputs
using CET production functions.
ψU = δU(XU , NU)
ψD = δD(XD, ND)
The value of imports is equal to the value of exports plus the endowment of
foreign exchange.
P˜MXM = P˜EXE + A¯
Factor demand equals factor supply:
KiU +K
i
D +K
i
E +K
f
D +K
f
E = K¯
LiU + L
i
D + L
i
E + L
f
D + L
f
E = L
Factors receive the same after-tax return wherever employed:
Psqr = Ps,∀s ∈ {K,L},∀q ∈ {i, f},∀r ∈ {U,D,E}
Taxes are zero for the informal good, informal factors, domestically produced
investment inputs, and investment:
Tj = 0 ∀j ∈ {U, {sir}, N, I},∀s ∈ {K,L},∀r ∈ {U,D,E}.
Formal factors face the same tax rates whether producing exports or formal
goods. This permits simpler notation:
TK ≡ TKfr , TL ≡ TLfr ,∀r ∈ {D,E}
The numeraire is foreign exchange:
PwM = 1
Goods supply equals demand.
XU = U
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XD = D
XM =M =MC +MI
IU + ID + IE = I
N = NU +ND
The transfer to the consumer is equal to tax revenue.
R = TEPEXE + TMPMXM + TDPDXD + TLPL(L
f
D + L
f
E) + TKPK(K
f
D +K
f
E)
Parameters in the model are: production and utility function parameters; en-
dowments of time, capital and foreign exchange; and tax rates. Parameter values
are determined by the calibration process.
APPENDIX 2: DATA
The data required for the model are:
E exports (% of GDP)
M imports (% of GDP)
I investment (% of GDP)
RD tax revenue from VATs and sales taxes (%GDP)
RE tax revenue from export taxes (% GDP)
RM tax revenue from import taxes (% GDP)
RK tax revenue from capital taxes (% GDP)
RL tax revenue from labour taxes (% GDP)
TD tax rate on domestic goods and services
TK tax rate on capital (corporate tax rate)
TL tax rate on labour
αU labour-output ratio in production of untaxed
Country-specific data are set out in Table 8. All country-specific data were
obtained from IMF Statistical Annexes to country reports, available on the internet
at www.imf.org. Table 8 also reports the year for which the data apply, and
whether the country had a VAT in that year.
Countries which separately report the VAT/sales tax on imported goods are:
Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, São Tomé
and Principe, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. In other countries, the tax
revenue data do not distinguish between VAT/sales tax on domestic goods and
VAT/sales tax on imported goods. This distinction is important for the calibration
of our model, so we estimate the VAT on domestic goods (Rd), according to the
following procedure: Rd = R x N/(N+Mc) where R = reported revenue from
VAT/sales tax; Mc = Imports x consumption/(consumption+investment) = share
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Table 8: Country-Specific Data
Year E M I RD RE RM RK RL Rev TD TK TL GDPpc
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2005 34.0 45.7 13.9 2.0 0.3 4.4 0.8 0.7 8.2 0.13 0.4 0.2 89
Burundi 2005 11.4 45.3 10.8 6.0 0.0 6.0 2.9 1.4 16.3 0.17 0.35 0.35 100
Malawi 2002 25.3 43.8 9.9 2.8 0.0 6.5 2.3 3.4 15.0 0.175 0.3 0.32 129
Guinea-Bissau 2005 37.6 55.1 14.6 0.9 1.3 6.4 1.2 0.8 10.6 0.15 0.3 0.22 134
Ethiopia* 2007 12.8 32.2 25.0 1.7 0.0 5.4 1.3 1.1 9.5 0.15 0.3 0.25 146
Niger* 2003 15.8 16.3 25.8 1.9 1.0 4.5 1.1 0.7 9.2 0.19 0.35 0.32 167
Eritrea 2001 2.5 55.5 19.9 3.8 0.0 5.3 5.0 1.8 15.8 0.12 0.3 0.25 181
Central African Rep.* 2006 13.9 21.7 8.8 2.8 0.4 2.2 1.0 0.7 7.2 0.19 0.3 0.35 223
Madagascar* 2004 31.7 48.0 27.5 1.9 0.0 6.8 0.9 0.8 10.3 0.2 0.3 0.15 229
Rwanda* 2003 8.3 27.6 18.4 3.0 0.0 5.0 1.9 1.8 11.8 0.18 0.35 0.3 239
Togo* 2006 40.5 60.1 13.0 1.6 0.0 9.6 1.7 0.2 13.1 0.18 0.37 0.22 240
Burkina Faso* 2003 8.9 21.7 17.0 3.2 0.0 4.2 1.5 1.0 10.0 0.18 0.2 0.2 241
Uganda* 2001 15.7 18.6 16.6 3.4 0.0 7.3 1.5 1.1 13.4 0.17 0.3 0.2 244
Ghana* 2004 37.0 57.7 27.9 3.2 1.2 7.5 2.9 2.7 17.5 0.125 0.28 0.275 272
Chad* 2005 54.9 21.0 20.2 0.6 0.1 1.5 0.8 1.1 4.0 0.18 0.4 0.4 274
Mali* 2004 24.6 32.0 20.7 3.4 0.3 8.1 1.2 1.5 14.5 0.18 0.35 0.28 276
Mozambique* 2004 30.0 39.3 20.1 2.5 0.1 3.1 0.8 1.8 8.3 0.17 0.32 0.25 295
Tanzania* 2003 17.8 26.7 18.6 2.7 0.0 4.7 0.8 1.7 9.9 0.2 0.3 0.25 299
Gambia 2007 54.0 69.9 25.0 1.4 0.0 12.4 3.0 2.2 19.0 0.15 0.35 0.2 320
Benin* 2006 11.3 22.6 18.1 3.2 0.0 8.3 2.1 1.4 15.0 0.18 0.38 0.33 324
Zambia* 2003 24.7 45.9 25.6 4.3 0.0 5.1 1.2 6.7 17.3 0.175 0.35 0.25 333
Sudan* 1999 8.1 15.1 16.7 1.1 0.1 3.0 0.9 0.1 5.2 0.1 0.4 0.25 350
Guinea* 2004 21.0 25.4 11.4 2.7 0.0 3.5 0.8 0.6 7.4 0.18 0.35 0.23 397
Kenya* 2002 26.0 31.4 13.4 5.2 0.0 5.8 3.5 2.6 17.1 0.18 0.3 0.2 403
Nigeria* 2004 49.7 41.5 23.9 1.0 0.0 3.9 7.3 1.8 14.1 0.05 0.3 0.2 409
Mauritania* 2002 40.0 52.6 26.8 3.4 0.0 6.5 2.1 2.5 14.5 0.14 0.25 0.26 413
Senegal* 2003 28.5 41.5 23.4 4.1 0.0 9.0 1.5 2.7 17.2 0.18 0.33 0.28 471
Zimbabwe 2001 14.8 25.7 5.6 4.0 0.0 3.7 2.5 7.5 17.7 0.15 0.3 0.35 564
Cote d’Ivoire* 2001 40.6 32.9 9.7 2.9 2.5 5.3 1.5 2.3 14.5 0.18 0.35 0.4 599
Cameroon* 2005 23.5 28.8 18.1 6.9 0.0 4.7 1.7 1.3 14.6 0.175 0.35 0.3 678
Congo, Rep.* 2004 84.4 57.3 24.2 0.7 0.0 4.9 1.8 1.3 8.7 0.18 0.38 0.3 1046
Cape Verde* 2005 16.9 50.9 37.9 4.7 0.0 8.7 3.8 2.9 20.0 0.15 0.2 0.275 1343
Swaziland 2007 76.9 87.2 16.2 0.8 0.2 28.4 2.7 5.1 37.2 0.14 0.3 0.26 1401
Namibia* 2005 52.2 52.5 26.0 3.1 0.0 13.7 3.8 6.5 27.1 0.15 0.35 0.345 2133
South Africa* 2005 21.5 25.9 18.2 6.1 0.0 4.3 6.0 8.3 24.6 0.14 0.3 0.35 3429
Gabon* 2003 54.2 30.1 26.4 3.1 0.8 4.9 1.8 1.7 12.3 0.18 0.35 0.25 4235
Botswana* 2005 49.8 35.1 34.8 2.6 0.0 8.4 2.4 1.8 15.2 0.1 0.25 0.2 4382
Equatorial Guinea* 2006 86.8 33.1 32.5 0.2 0.1 0.5 8.6 0.7 10.1 0.15 0.35 0.25 7470
Average 31.8 38.8 20.1 2.9 0.2 6.4 2.3 2.2 14.0 0.16 0.32 0.27 907
* indicates countries with a VAT. Rev is the sum of revenues from the five taxes considered,
not total tax revenue. GDP per capita is expressed in constant 2000 US$, for the relevant year
for each country. GDP per capita is taken from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. All other data are drawn from IMF Country Report Statistical Annexes.
Table 9: Labour-Output Ratios in Untaxed Goods (%)
Malawi South Africa Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Average
58.66 53.99 43.79 53.15 49.70 51.86
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of imported goods that are consumed rather than invested; N = Consumption -
Mc = consumption of non-imported goods. We add (R-Rd) to the revenue from
import taxes.
The countries of the Southern African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) share imports tax revenue according to a
formula that gives a reduced share of the revenue to South Africa. Our calibration
method is inaccurate to the extent that the formula differs from the share of
regional imports that is consumed by each country.
In the absence of data on the labour-output ratio in the informal economy, the
model uses the average ratio for the five countries of Table 9, supposing that the
ratio is constant across all countries. These data are derived from social accounting
matrices prepared by the International Food Policy Research Institute. Among
other data, the SAMs provide for each commodity: the value-added by each factor;
exports of each commodity; domestic demand for the commodity; and goods taxes
paid. We classified commodities as untaxed if the taxes paid on the commodity
constituted less than 5% of the value of domestic output of the commodity. Let
Li denote the labour share of value added for each commodity i. Let U be the set
of untaxed goods, and Ui be the value-added of each untaxed good i. The labour-
output ratio for untaxed is then calculated as
P
i(Li×Ui)P
i Ui
∀i ∈ U . For comparison,
the average labour-output ratio for exports is 36.86%, and for domestic is 43.28%.
The administrative costs of tax collection presented in Table 4 are derived
from various sources. For the United States: IRS Data Book, FY2002, avail-
able at: www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02db30cs.xls; For other OECD countries – au-
thors’ calculations based on the following tax agency annual reports: Australia –
ATO Annual Report 2002, available at www.ato.gov.au; United Kingdom – In-
land Revenue, Annual Report for the year ending 31st March 2002, available at
www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/pdfs/report2002.pdf; New Zealand – Inland Revenue
Annual Report 2001-2002, available at: www.ird.govt. nz/aboutir/reports/annual-
02.pdf; and Canada: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, 2001-2002 Annual Re-
port to Parliament, Financial Statements, available at www.cra-arc.gc.ca/agency/
annual/2001-2002/. For Guatemala: simple average of adjusted figures from Mann
(2002). Ghana: revenue-weighted average of figures cited by Terkper (1995).
Namibia: statistics provided by Klaus Schade of the Namibian Economic Policy
Research Unit. Tanzania: statistics provided by Odd-Helge Fjeldstad of the Chr.
Michelsen Institute. Remaining countries: Taliercio (2004). We are very grateful
to Klaus Schade, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Robert Taliercio for their assistance in
obtaining these data.
APPENDIX 3: Model Calibration
The economic relationships in the model can be represented by a rectangular
SAM such as Table 10. The entries in the SAM are expressed as percentages of
GDP at market value. All rows and columns sum to zero, reflecting a Walrasian
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Table 10: SAM for Guinea-Bissau 2005
Consumer Untaxed Domestic Exports Imports Investment Foreign Govt
Untaxed -47.97 47.97
Domestic -6.65 5.79 0.87
Exports 36.38 -37.65 1.27
Imports -48.26 48.69 -6.83 6.41
Foreign Exchange 11.04 -48.69 37.65
Inv. inputs (IN) 6.90 0.83 -7.73
Investment Good -8.17 -0.98 -5.42 14.57
Informal Capital 26.51 -11.67 -2.34 -12.51
Formal Capital 4.14 -0.65 -3.49
Informal Labour 46.73 -35.03 -1.75 -9.95
Formal Labor 3.83 -0.57 -3.26
Capital Taxes -0.20 -1.05 1.24
Labour Taxes -0.13 -0.72 0.84
Transfers 10.62 -10.62
Figures represent a percentage of GDP at market value. The tax inclusive value of production
of all goods except imports sums to 100.
equilibrium in which incomes equal expenditures. In the consumer’s column posi-
tive entries are endowments or factor incomes, negative figures are expenditures on
goods, including investment. In the production columns, positive entries are the
receipt of sales revenue or investment, and negative entries are payments to factors
or factor taxes. In the government’s column, positive figures are tax revenues, the
negative figure is the transfer to consumers. The ‘Foreign’ column represents the
purchase of exports and the sale of imports by the rest of the world, using foreign
exchange.
Benchmark quantities of goods and factors (entries in the SAM) are calculated
using the following equations:
XD =
RD
TD
production of domestic
XE = E −RE production of exports
XM =M −RM quantity of imports
A¯ = XM − E endowment of foreign exchange
C = 100− I − (E −M) aggregate consumption
MC =M × CC+I share of imports that is consumed
XU = C −MC −XD −RD production of untaxed
MI =M × IC+I imports input into investment good
INU = (I −MI)× XUXU+XD untaxed input into investment good
IND = (I −MI)× XDXU+XD domestic input into investment good
IU = I × XU+I
N
U
XU+I
N
U +XD+I
N
D+XE
investment in untaxed production
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IDE = I × XD+I
N
D+XE
XU+I
N
U +XD+I
N
D+XE
investment in other production
KfD =
XD+I
N
D
XD+I
N
D+XE
RK
TK
formal capital used to produce
domestic
KfE =
XE
XD+I
N
D+XE
RK
TK
formal capital used to produce
exports
LfD =
XD+I
N
D
XD+I
N
D+XE
RL
TL
formal labour used to produce do-
mestic
LfE =
XE
XD+I
N
D+XE
RL
TL
formal labour used to produce ex-
ports
FF = KfD +K
f
E + L
f
D + L
f
E Cost of formal factors
FS = XD + I
N
D +XE − IDE Sales of formal output, less in-
vestment costs
AF = FS − FF −RK −RL Funds distributed to informal fac-
tors in formal sector
KiD = AF × K
f
D
FF
informal capital used to produce
domestic
KiE = AF × K
f
E
FF
informal capital used to produce
exports
LiD = AF × L
f
D
FF
informal labour used to produce
domestic
LiE = AF × L
f
E
FF
informal labour used to produce
exports
KiU = (1− αU)(XU + INU − IU) informal capital used to produce
untaxed
LiU = αU(XU + I
N
U − IU) informal labour used to produce
untaxed
ID = XD + I
N
D − (KfD +KiD + LfD +
LiD +
XD+I
N
D
XD+I
N
D+XE
RK +
XD+I
N
D
XD+I
N
D+XE
RL)
investment in domestic
IE = XE − (KfE + KiE + LfE + LiE +
XE
XD+I
N
D+XE
RK +
XE
XD+I
N
D+XE
RL)
investment in exports
K¯ = KfE +K
f
D +K
i
E +K
i
D +K
i
U total capital endowment
L = LfE + L
f
D + L
i
E + L
i
D + L
i
U total labour supply
T¯ = LL endowment of time, where L is
elasticity of labour supply
Tax rates on exports and imports are calibrated, rather than being drawn
directly from the legal tax rates:
TE =
RE
XE
tax rate on exports
TM =
RM
XM
tax rate on imports
We do not observe price or quantities of goods, but we do observe the total
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amount of money spent on each good (values as a percentage of GDP). Following
the Harberger convention we choose units of the aggregate goods such that quan-
tities equal values. This implies that initial prices equal one. Where goods are
taxed, goods units can be chosen such that either the gross of tax or net of tax
price equals one. We chose units such that the agent supplying the good or factor
received a price of one, with remaining prices implied by tax rates:
PwM = 1 world price of imports (and foreign exchange)
PI = 1 price of investment
PU = 1 price of untaxed
PL = 1 wage received by labour (formal or informal); also the wage paid by
producers for informal labour
PK = 1 wage received by capital (formal or informal); also the wage paid by
producers for informal capital
PD = 1 producer price of domestic
PE = 1 producer price of exports
An n-factor CES production function, F = A(
∑n
j=1 θjX
ρ
j )
1
ρ , with factors Xj,
share parameters θj, scale parameter A, and elasticity of substitution σ = 11−ρ , can
be rewritten in calibrated form as
F = F¯
[
n∑
i=1
(
p¯iX¯i∑n
j=1 p¯jX¯j
)(
Xi
X¯i
)ρ] 1ρ
where a bar over a variable indicates the observed benchmark level. The bench-
mark factor demands, factor prices and product outputs, combined with the elas-
ticities of substitution fully specify the three production functions. The Cobb-
Douglas coefficient in the base case are θj = p¯iX¯iPn
j=1 p¯jX¯j
j = 1, ..., n. The same
methodology can be used for the CES utility function, where the Xis represent
goods consumed, the pis are goods prices, and the benchmark utility level is nor-
malized to unity.
The calibration process is completed with the selection of substitution elas-
ticities for production and utility functions. In our base case we chose unitary
elasticities.
The calibration process provides estimates of the untaxed economy, which we
treat as synonymous with the informal economy. There is overlap between our
measures of the untaxed economy, and measures of the ‘shadow’ economy, as sug-
gested in Table 11. As discussed in the main text, however, our estimates are larger
to the extent that they include legal untaxed activities (eg informal agriculture),
and smaller to the extent that they do not include illegal activities that are not
caught by official GDP statistics. The coefficient of correlation with Schneider’s
(2005) measure of the shadow economy is 0.29 in the case of untaxed goods, and
0.17 in the case of untaxed factors.
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Table 11: Size of the Informal Sector (% GDP)
U Ki+ Li Shadow
Untaxed good sales Informal factors Economy
Congo, Dem. Rep. 40.0 76.7 49.7
Burundi 40.0 66.7 38.7
Malawi 50.4 63.4 42.1
Guinea Bissau 47.9 69.6
Ethiopia 55.9 62.1 42.1
Niger 51.0 64.1 43.8
Eritrea 49.2 45.8
Central African Rep. 61.3 81.0 46.1
Madagascar 40.7 61.2 41.6
Rwanda 58.1 63.3 42.2
Togo 42.6 77.9 40.4
Burkina Faso 56.1 64.8 43.3
Uganda 47.0 66.6 45.4
Ghana 20.9 41.8 43.6
Chad 27.7 72.6 48.0
Mali 38.4 63.9 44.7
Mozambique 39.8 65.1 42.4
Tanzania 52.3 66.5 60.2
Gambia 25.4 48.6
Benin 53.3 65.4 49.1
Zambia 31.4 32.2 50.8
Sudan 65.3 78.4
Guinea 52.9 80.0 41.3
Kenya 30.8 50.6 36.0
Nigeria 16.4 32.3 59.4
Mauritania 18.1 47.4 37.9
Senegal 30.1 54.1 47.5
Zimbabwe 49.9 50.8 63.2
Cote d’Ivoire 34.0 71.1 45.2
Cameroon 18.0 63.0 34.9
Congo, Rep. 5.7 62.7 50.1
Cape Verde 23.6 21.4
Swaziland 13.0 46.4
Namibia 11.4 31.1 33.4
South Africa 15.2 18.1 29.5
Gabon 9.5 54.3
Botswana 1.6 39.5 34.6
Equatorial Guinea 2.7 30.6
Average 34.9 56.6 44.2
Values of untaxed good sales and informal factors used to produce formal goods are from our
calibration algorithm. Values of the ‘shadow’ economy are from Schneider (2005).
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Table 12: MCFs in the Informal Sector
Country U Ki KiDE L
i LiDE
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.92 0.97 1.06 0.98 1.05
Burundi 0.86 0.91 1.02 0.93 1.11
Malawi 0.86 0.89 1.10 0.87 1.06
Guinea Bissau 0.90 0.93 1.09 0.96 1.08
Ethiopia 0.90 0.92 1.26 0.93 1.29
Niger 0.90 0.94 1.24 0.96 1.30
Eritrea 0.84 0.76 1.02 0.87 1.27
Central African Rep. 0.93 0.96 1.13 0.97 1.17
Madagascar 0.90 0.95 1.12 0.96 1.10
Rwanda 0.88 0.89 1.32 0.89 1.33
Togo 0.90 0.95 1.04 0.98 1.18
Burkina Faso 0.90 0.91 1.19 0.93 1.26
Uganda 0.86 0.91 1.13 0.92 1.16
Ghana 0.82 0.86 0.96 0.86 0.97
Chad 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.98
Mali 0.86 0.93 1.15 0.93 1.11
Mozambique 0.92 0.96 1.07 0.95 1.02
Tanzania 0.90 0.95 1.22 0.93 1.13
Gambia 0.82 0.84 0.94 0.89 0.98
Benin 0.85 0.89 1.29 0.91 1.39
Zambia 0.83 0.86 -0.26 0.73 0.69
Sudan 0.95 0.97 1.15 0.99 1.26
Sao Tome 0.82 0.73 0.98 0.69 0.96
Guinea 0.92 0.97 1.10 0.98 1.11
Kenya 0.82 0.85 0.98 0.88 1.02
Nigeria 0.85 0.80 0.83 0.87 0.93
Mauritania 0.85 0.90 0.97 0.90 0.97
Senegal 0.83 0.90 1.09 0.89 1.02
Zimbabwe 0.82 0.86 -3.10 0.77 0.35
Cote d’Ivoire 0.86 0.94 1.06 0.93 1.03
Cameroon 0.82 0.92 0.97 0.93 0.98
Congo, Rep. 0.89 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.97
Cape Verde 0.79 0.72 0.94 0.73 1.00
Swaziland 0.68 0.81 0.95 0.82 0.90
Namibia 0.70 0.75 0.85 0.74 0.82
South Africa 0.72 0.70 0.82 0.67 0.77
Gabon 0.83 0.92 0.97 0.94 0.98
Botswana 0.75 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92
Equatorial Guinea 0.87 0.82 0.83 0.89 0.98
Average 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.90 1.04
Maximum 0.95 0.97 1.32 0.99 1.39
Minimum 0.68 0.70 -3.10 0.67 0.35
Std. Dev. 0.06 0.07 0.71 0.08 0.19
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